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Abstrak: Fatwa Transnasional tentang Jihad di Indonesia. Fatwa memiliki kedudukan yang khusus dalam 
perkembangan hukum Islam. Kehadirannya dapat memberikan pengaruh terhadap sikap dan perilaku keagamaan 
seseorang. Meskipun fatwa merupakan produk ijtihad tetapi ia tetap dianggap sebagai aturan hukum yang harus 
dipatuhi terutama jika fatwa dikeluarkan oleh seorang ulama besar atau badan otoritas ulama yang memiliki pengaruh 
luas di masyarakat. Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk menelusuri pengaruh fatwa-fatwa transnasional tentang jihad yang 
mempengaruhi perilaku beragama masyarakat di Indonesia. Fatwa-fatwa tentang jihad mendorong sebagian umat 
Islam Indonesia untuk melakukan tindak kekerasan terhadap non Muslim. Gangguan terhadap agama menjadi salah 
satu alasan tindak kekerasan kepada mereka.
Kata kunci: fatwa, jihad, kekerasan, ulama
Abstract: Transnational Fatwas on Jihad in Indonesia. Fatwa has an important stake in Islamic legal development. 
Its presence is able to provide influences on person’s religious attitude and behaviour. Although fatwa is a product 
of ijtihad, it’s still considered as a rule which should be obeyed especially if it is pronounced by a great scholar or 
authorised body which has wide influence over the community. This paper will study thoroughly the transnational 
fatwas on jihad which had influenced people’s religious attitude and behavior of many Indonesian Muslims. Fatwas on 
jihad motivated Indonesian Muslims to carry out violence towards non Muslims. The disturbance on religion became 
one of the reasons of violent actions towards them.
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Introduction 
Fatwa, along with its multi dimensional aspects, is 
an important part of Islamic legal historiography and an 
exciting field study. Many books have been written on 
fatwa by Islamic scholars and legal experts on a national 
and global level.
If we focus on fatwas in Indonesia, we could see that 
fatwas have existed in Indonesian Muslim community 
since colonial periods. Fatwas were given by local Islamic 
scholar, transnational Islamic scholar, institutions, 
groups or organizations such as The Council of 
Indonesian Islamic Scholar (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 
founded in 1975), Muhammadiyah (founded in 1926), 
Nahdlatul Ulama (founded in 1928), al-Washliyah 
(founded in 1930) and several other organizations in 
Indonesia. 
For the case of Indonesia, fatwa and its social context 
are fascinating subjects of research. Besides functioning 
as legal regulations, fatwa also functions as a united 
factor for Indonesian Muslim community in numerous 
historical events such as the independence war against 
the colonial government, as well as a united factor for 
Indonesian development in the era of Old Order, New 
Order and Reformation.
From New Order to Reformation when fatwas are 
referred to the reference is usually to fatwas issued by The 
Council of Indonesian Islamic Scholar (MUI) which 
since its foundation has been the most authoritative 
body or institution to issue fatwas concerning Islamic 
legal issues in Indonesia. As such Atho Mudzhar in his 
research explicitly stated that the release of fatwa, for 
example MUI’s fatwa in the years from 1975 to 1988, 
cannot escape the influence of socio-cultural dynamics 
of Indonesia.1
Another study which focuses on development of 
1 M. Atho Mudzhar, Fatwa-Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia: Sebuah 
Studi tentang Pemikiran Hukum Islam di Indonesia 1975-1988, (Jakarta: 
INIS [Indonesian Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies],1993), 
p. 5. This book is a translation of his dissertation, completed in McGill 
University, Canada, titled Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: A 
Study of Islamic Legal Thought in Indonesia, 1975-1988.  
 Received: 10th September 2013, reveised: 15th October 2013, 
accepted: 30th November 2013.
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fatwas is by MB. Hooker, a professor at Australian 
National University. His book has been translated to 
Indonesian titled “Islam Madzhab Indonesia: Fatwa-
Fatwa dan Perubahan Sosial”. Hooker’s study was 
based on four important Islamic organizations as its 
main sources: Persis, NU, Muhammadiyah and MUI. 
It highlighted a number of fatwas issued from the 
1920s to 1930s. Hooker was fascinated with the many 
similarities and differences which he found among the 
Islamic organizations researched.2
If we examine the current development of fatwas in 
Indonesia, we could see that they cannot be extricated 
from the context of historical scholarly relationship 
(thought) between Indonesian Islam and Middle 
Eastern Islam centred in Mecca, which in turn later 
would relate substantially to the development of fatwas 
in Egyptian Islam.
The robust relationship was indeed rooted in the 
scholarly networks of Indonesian and Middle Eastern 
scholar. Numerous Indonesian scholars who studied in 
the Middle East later returned to Indonesia and spread 
the Islamic mode of thought they obtained from the 
Middle East. Several illustrious figures who emerged 
from these networks are Nuruddin al-Raniri (d. 
1068/1658), Abdurrauf al-Singkili (1024-1105/1615-
1693) and Muhammad Yusuf al-Maqassari (1037-
1111/1627-1699).3 
Judging by the robustness of the relationship it was 
not surprising that lay Indonesian Muslims felt very 
close to Middle Eastern Muslims and their scholars. 
Often Indonesian Muslims would request fatwas for 
ritual, social, political and economic issues from the 
Middle Eastern scholars especially when Indonesia was 
under colonial rule. 
Nico Kaptein described that many requests were 
made, which compilation could be gleaned from 
“Muhimmât al-Nafâ’is fî Bayân al-‘Illat al-Hadîts”, 
reaching its zenith towards the end of the 19th century 
with fatwa published by the most prestigious scholars 
(muftî) in Mecca which the most prolific scholars being 
Ahmad Dahlan, Syâfi’iyyah (followers of Syâfi’î) muftî 
(d. 1886). Not surprisingly Mecca was the centre of 
 2 MB. Hooker, Islam Madzhab Indonesia: Fatwa-Fatwa dan 
Perubahan Sosial, (South Jakarta: Teraju, 2003), p. 93.
3 For further information about the scholarly networks between 
Indonesian and Middle Eastern scholars and their thought development, 
along with social, political, economic and religious development, 
see Azyumardi Azra, Jaringan Ulama Timur Tengah dan Kepulauan 
Nusantara Abad XVII dan XVIII: Akar Pembaharuan Islam Indonesia, 
(Jakarta: Prenada Media, 2004).
authority for religious issues in traditional Indonesia.4
One of the most critical questions is despite the 
intimate scholarly relationships between Indonesian 
and Middle Eastern scholars, why does the Indonesian 
Muslim community still request fatwas from Middle 
Eastern scholars? Couldn’t the local scholar issue fatwas 
to solve the legal problems of their community? One of 
the answers as given by Kaptein was that there was no 
uniformity of opinion among local muftî such that fatwa 
seekers sought the counsel of Meccan scholar deemed 
possessing higher authority.5 Another question is to 
what extent the fatwas of Middle Eastern scholar got 
implemented by the Indonesian Muslim community 
and how much impact do fatwas have towards the life 
of society?
The practice of giving fatwas seen from various 
perspectives and settings by an individual or a group of 
scholar in a particular state to another state is defined 
as transnational fatwa. Transnational fatwas are fatwas 
which travel outside its locus (between mustaftî and 
muftî from different states who may never even meet) 
based on requests which the author define as “fatwas 
following the law of supply and demand”.
From the perspective of legal psychology, the 
acceptance, application and effectiveness of transnational 
fatwas has more traction than local fatwas. This was 
caused by the assumption that fatwa from scholar who 
reside internationally, in this case from the Middle East, 
was and still considered by most of Indonesian Muslims 
as more authoritative than fatwa from local scholar. 
As time goes by, along with development of 
information technology, fatwas could be more easily 
communicated to society and more people know and 
subscribe to them.
More importantly, Umej Bathia noted that 
transnational fatwas accessible through cyberspace, 
what he dubbed as cyber-fatwas, carry greater potential 
to mobilize the global Muslim community (ummah) 
and sometimes are used as legitimation call for jihad 
by groups who consider themselves at war to defend 
their rights. The most current case in the global scene 
are fatwas of jihad by Osama bin Laden distributed 
through his infamous al-Qaeda networ, with the West 
4 For more on this matter see Nico J. G. Kaptein, The Voice of 
the Ulama: Fatwas and Religious Authority in Indonesia, (Archives de 
Sciences Sociales des Religions Arch. de Sc. Soc. Des Rel., 2004), p. 
116. 
5 Nico J. G. Kaptein, The Voice of The Ulama: Fatwas and Religious 
Authority in Indonesia, p. 117.
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as targets of jihad.6
Contemporary transnational fatwa with Osama 
bin Laden as a central figure has changed the nature 
of traditional fatwa from being based on justice and 
social welfare to being based on threat and terror. When 
discussing about transnational fatwa, what has always 
come up is the question of jihad, the war between al-
Qaeda (Osama bin Laden) with the United States and 
its allies.
Through fatwas of jihad, the al-Qaeda group, along 
with other groups of militant Muslims usually termed 
salafî7, always proposed the notion of “clash” between 
the East (Islam) and West (Christian), not peace as 
insisted by humanity and religion. As such, it is not 
surprising that Western public (non Muslim) confused 
fatwa as a rigid or radical solution, such as declarations 
of war, death sentences (an example would be the fatwa 
issued by Ayatollah Khomeini upon Salman Rushdie, 
an British novelist who wrote a novel titled “The Satanic 
Verses”) and violation of human rights.8
In the context of transnational fatwa for Indonesia 
today we could see the fatwa of Middle Eastern scholar 
on the obligation of Indonesian Muslim community 
to perform jihad in Ambon, Maluku, during the social 
unrest of 1999, covered by many local and international 
media as interreligious unrest (Christians against 
Muslims) in the eastern part of Indonesia.
Along several lines of thinking on transnational fatwa 
 6 Further see Umej Bathia, «Transnasional Fatwa and Radical 
Jihad», in IDSS Commentaries, no. 19, 2004, Nanyang Avenue 
Singapore: Institute of Defence and Startegic Studies. in , accessed on 31 
May 2001.
7 Many experts categorize the Salafî groups as extreme and anti 
Western. Followers of these groups rejected idea and thoughts of 
Western origin based on the reason that Western thoughts are in 
opposition to Islamic doctrines. They claim that these idea come 
from the enemies of Islam especially Jews and Christians who intent 
to destroy Islam. One ‘Western idea’ rejected by the Salafî group is 
democracy such as election of leaders based on the majority votes which 
they considered a deviation of Islamic spirit. According to these Salafî 
groups, Islam teaches its followers to trust in God and when choosing 
leaders Muslims must choose based on values of faith and morality. 
The authority to lead the Islamic community must be chosen by an 
institution, ahl al-hall wa al-’aqd, consisting of scholar and politician 
who always submit to the will of God Almighty. As a consequence, 
every Muslim must obey the leader (imâm) chosen by this institution. 
Giving power to a leader based on majority votes does not guarantee 
that a leader will not make mistake and will fight for the defense and 
prosperity of Muslims. The return to Alquran and sunah is the only 
way to solve all Muslim problems. See Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, Salafî 
Da’wa Movement After The Dissolution of Laskar Jihad, (State Islamic 
University Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta), p. 22-23. See also Noorhaidi 
Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post-
New Order Indonesia, (Utrecht: Faculteit der Letteren en Internatonal 
Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World, 2005).
8 Umej Bathia, Transnasional Fatwa and Radical Jihad, p. 3.
and trends in the development (and thought) of Islamic 
legal systems, such as the acceptance of transnational 
fatwa by Indonesian Muslims, it becomes paramount 
to delve into its intricacies especially on the obligation 
of jihad. This is because the legal and formal strength of 
transnasional fatwa, especially concerning jihad, as legal 
guide for mustaftî, has increased as it penetrates state, 
cultural and borders, a phenomenon characterized in 
contemporary legal terminology as transnationalized 
law.9
Typology of Fatwa
Traditional Fatwa
With regards to fatwas in Indonesia, Nico Kaptein 
categorized fatwas into 3 types: traditional fatwa, modern 
fatwa dan collective fatwa. He defined traditional fatwa 
as fatwa issued by Meccan muftî in colonial times 
before the spread of Islamic reform idea to Indonesia 
(the Netherlands East Indies) in the early twentieth 
century inspired by Muhammad Abduh, Rasyid 
Ridha and others from Egypt. These traditional fatwas 
were collected in the volume “Muhimmât al-Nafâ’is fî 
Bayân al-‘Illat al-Hadîts” which contained answers to a 
variety of ritual worship issues, inheritance regulations, 
marital regulations, food regulations, ethics, customs 
and relations with non Muslim government. As such 
the volume “Muhimmât al-Nafâ’is fî Bayân al-‘Illat al-
Hadîts”, according to Kaptein, can be considered as a 
representation of legal thoughts of traditional scholar 
then.
One example of traditional fatwa in “Muhimmât 
al-Nafâ’is fî Bayân al-‘Illat al-Hadîts” is the case in 
Palembang regarding the permissibility of performance 
of Friday prayers in two separate, nearby mosques of 
a city, so near that the voice of muadzdzins of both 
mosques can be heard at the same time. The answer given 
by the Syâfi’iyyah muftî Sayyid Ahmad Dahlan was that 
9 Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Herbert von Benda-Beckmann 
elaborated that legal regulations are transnationalized when the 
regulations cross the original state borders to be implemented in 
the detination state. Technically, transnational law is also called 
as transplanted law, a particular state’s legislation transplanted to 
another state to be used as legal regulation internally (internal use). 
Furthermore, Beckmann and Beckmann stated that “Transnational 
law may refer to the rules and institutions regulating (inter) action, 
relationship or wider networks that transcend national boundaries.
Transnational law comprises all law that regulate actions or events that 
transcend national frontiers. It includes both civil and criminal aspects 
and may also involve states, individual, cooperations and other groups. 
See Franz von Benda-Beckmann dan Herbert von Benda-Beckmann, 
“Transnationalization of Law, Globalization and Legal Pluralism” 
in Sulistyowati Irianto (editor), Hukum yang Bergerak: Tinjauan 
Antropologi Hukum, (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor, 2009), p. 6-15.
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the prayers in both mosques are valid if the distance is 
sufficiently far such that it is difficult for someone who 
lives near one mosque to pray at the other.10
 
Modern Fatwa
The example of modern fatwa in this case are fatwas 
issued by Persatuan Islam (PERSIS) headed by Ahmad 
Hassan (1887-1958) and published in Persis Journal 
titled “Jurnal Pembela Islam” (Journal of the Defender 
of Islam) printed from 1929 to 1935. The journal has a 
chapter titled “Soeal Djawab” (Question and Answer), 
containing a variety of answers to religious queries 
of the public. An example of fatwa is regarding the 
permissibility of drum calling before adzân to ready 
people for congregational prayers. The answer given by 
Ahmad Hassan was that drum calling never performed 
by the Prophet and his companions. The companions’ 
numerous suggestions to call people for congregational 
prayer were vetoed by the Prophet. As such it is the 
obligations of Muslims to refuse all other attempts 
to call people to congregational prayer at the mosque 
except through adzân.
Bukhârî and Muslim narrated a tradition:
When the Muslims had entered Madina, they used 
to come together and wait for the [right time to start 
the] prayer without anyone making the call for it. On 
a certain day they began to speak about this and some 
said: “Let us use a drum like the drum of the Christians”, 
while others said: “Let us use a horn like the horns of the 
Jews”. Then `Umar said: “Why don’t you order a man to 
make the call for prayer?”. For the Messenger of God has 
said: “O Bilâl, get up and make the call for prayer!”.11
There are several reasons why fatwas issued by 
Ahmad Hasan through Persis are considered modern. 
Since the early twentieth century Indonesian Muslims 
have directed their fatwa request at scholar who resides 
in Indonesia, not scholar who resides in Mecca. In 
contrast to earlier fatwas, Ahmad Hassan’s fatwas were 
issued neither in Arabic nor Malay Arabic (Jawi) letters 
which can be read only by those who can understand 
Arabic or at least familiar with its letters but the fatwas 
were issued in Latin alphabets such that more people 
could read it  and they were even translated to local 
languages such as Sundanese12 and more remarkably, 
10  Nico Kaptein, The Muhimmât al-Nafâ’is: a Bilingual Meccan 
Fatwa Collection for Indonesian Muslims from the End of the Nineteenth 
Century, prefaced and elaborated by Nico Kaptein, (Jakarta: INIS 
Materials 32, 1997), p. 111-112. The complete social history of the 
issuance of this fatwa can also be seen in Husni Rahiem, Sistem Otoritas 
dan Administrasi Islam: Studi tentang Pejabat Agama Masa Kesultanan 
dan Kolonial di Palembang, (Jakarta: Logos, 1998), p. 220-228.
11 Nico J. G. Kaptein, The Voice of The Ulama: Fatwas and Religious 
Authority in Indonesia, p. 118-119.
12 Akh Minhaji, Ahmad Hassan and Legal Reform in Indonesia, 
(Yogyakarta: Kurnia Kalam Semesta, 2001), p. 79-80.
according to Kaptein, Ahmad Hassan used rational 
(ra’y) methodology in his ijtihads. Hassan emphasized 
that ijtihad is obligatory for a scholar, while lay people 
(‘awwâm), eventhough they lack the knowledge of 
Arabic must know the reasons for the issuance of any 
particular fatwa by an scholar. For Ahmad Hassan, 
there are only two reasons to arrive at a fatwa, through 
ijtihad or ittibâ’ while taqlîd is not permissible.13
Collective Fatwa
 In the first half of the twentieth century there 
was an important change to fatwa giving. Previously 
fatwa was issued by scholar as individual while in the new 
century fatwa was issued collectively or institutionally 
such as fatwa issued by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and 
Muhammadiyah which began to issue fatwa collectively 
since 1927.14
Another example of a collective fatwa was by al-
Washliyah, founded in 1930 in Medan during its fifth 
congress also in Medan, about the obligation of Muslims 
to fight the Dutch and its allies who attempted to take 
over Indonesia again in 1945 after the Indonesian 
Declaration of Idependence on 17 August 1945. In 
detail the fatwa contained two important matters, 
first being every Muslim has an obligation to fight to 
defend Indonesia’s hard earned independence from 
the Dutch and second being every Muslim who died 
during the fight with intention of defending Islam died 
a martyr. The fatwa was also published in al-Washliyah 
magazine in 1941 which was banned from publication 
by the colonial government that same year due to its 
frequent provocation of society to resist the colonial 
government. Furthermore al-Washliyah released a policy 
to encourage every al-Washliyah member and their 
family to participate in defensive war through “Laskar 
Hizbullah” founded by al-Washliyah and in 1955 al-
Washliyah again released a policy encouraging every 
Muslim, especially al-Washliyah members, to choose 
Masjumi Party during the General Election of 1955.15
13 Nico J. G. Kaptein, The Voice of The Ulama: Fatwas and Religious 
Authority in Indonesia, p. 118-119. See also Akh Minhaji, Ahmad 
Hassan, p. 141.
14 Nico J. G. Kaptein, The Voice of The Ulama: Fatwas and Religious 
Authority in Indonesia, p. 120. Further on the history and development 
of fatwa in NU tradition see Martin van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, 
Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru, (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 1994), 
p. 220-234. The collection of fatwas issued by NU since 1926 till 
1994 can be seen in Koleksi Fatwa NU dari Kongres Tahun 1926-1994, 
collected by Aziz Masyhuri in 1997.
15 Further on the fatwa and the chronology of its issuance see 
Ansari, Mission In Chriatianity and Islam: A Comparative Study of 
The Ways The Huria Kristen Batak Protestan (HKBP) and al-Washliyah 
Spread The Mission In North Sumatra (1930-1965), (Belanda: Leiden 
Univeristy, 1998), p. 75-76. 
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Another example of collective fatwa as presented 
by Kaptein was the fatwa issued by Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia (MUI) which was founded based on the 
initiative of the then Indonesian President, Soeharto, 
to assemble scholar on a national level for coordination 
purpose with Muslim society. Aside from the initiative to 
involve scholar to find solutions to Muslim community 
problems related to the government, MUI has worked 
at the level of institution to issue many other fatwas 
relevant to the problems of Muslim community. 
MUI’s fatwas were not only issued based on request by 
individuals or groups but also based on the request of 
the government to assist in the success of government 
programs, such as fatwa on the implementation of 
Planned Parenthood.16
It is astonishing to observe that a fatwa issued 
institutionally by MUI on behest of the government 
seemed to have quite a significant societal impact in the 
sense that it was felt as “binding”, caused not only by 
religious reason but also by an “alignment” of interest 
between MUI and the government. Perhaps there has 
always been a legal syergy between MUI’s fatwa and 
government’s program in which the government “utilize” 
the MUI’s fatwa to influence society to participate in 
the implementation of government’s program.
Fatwa as Changing Law
Transplantation of Global Law
A number of legal experts has stated, as mentioned 
by Beckmann and Beckmann, that a static law would 
not be able to keep up with the development of society 
in different times and places. As such, along with 
the development (globalisation) of society in all its 
forms, willing or not, directly or indirectly, law must 
develop along with time and locus be it regionally or 
transnationally, as can be seen by international treaty or 
agreement which is often defined as transnationalized 
law or globalized law.17
If we observe the development of law in the 
course of history, we cannot deny that law has found 
a transnational form such as law applied by colonial 
governments in its colony. As examples: English law 
applied in several Asian countries including Malaysia 
and Singapore; French law implemented in its colony in 
16 One fatwa requested by the government is a fatwa on Planned 
Parenthood issued by MUI in 1983. More details on this fatwa see M. 
Atho Mudzhar, Fatwa-Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia, p. 126-132.
17 Further see Franz von Benda-Beckmann dan Herbert von 
Benda-Beckmann, “Transnationalization of Law, Globalization and 
Legal Pluralism” in Sulistyowati Irianto (editor), Hukum yang Bergerak: 
Tinjauan Antropologi Hukum, p. 6-15.
Africa including Morocco and Egypt;18 and Dutch law 
implemented in Indonesia. In theory, aside from many 
weaknesses, the implementation of this transnational 
law could be categorized as transplanted law.
A legal development which should attract academic 
attention is that many former colonial states have not 
been able to escape the influence and implementation 
of colonial law. Several states, Islamic or with a Muslim 
majority, have attemped to reformulate their law based 
on local wisdom or religious teachings but many have 
not been able to exit the cocoon of Western law. As a 
consequence there has been no other option but to have 
a mixed system, such as between Islamic and Civil Law, 
between Islamic and Common Law, and or between 
Civil and Traditional Law especially related to civil 
issues (al-ahwâl al-syakhshiyyah)19 such as the case for 
Indonesia.
However, if we scrutinize Indonesian legal cases, 
such as criminal and civil law, we will find two different 
forms of national legal system. In criminal cases, for 
example, the legal system used still refers to European 
legal system with the addition of Indonesian values 
and for civil cases the legal system used will be all three 
systems (Islamic Law, Civil Law and Customary Law). 
What is more interesting is all three systems are valid 
constitutionally. A legal subject can choose any law for 
their cases. For example, for specific civil cases, Muslims 
can choose between Islamic or European law (civil law) 
contained in BW. For non Muslims, they can only choose 
civil law. In several regions, after the implementation 
of regional autonomy such as Aceh and Banten, they 
have implemented Islamic legal system in the forms of 
Islamic Regional Law (PERDA Syariah).
Aside from the question of whether the existing legal 
pluralism is a bane or boon for the state, we need to 
observe that the diversity of legal systems used especially 
the Islamic one can contribute to confusing legal 
applications which might quite possibly be infiltrated 
by global or transnational legal thoughts. This because 
in Islam, there exists a principle which states that Islamic 
law applies for all places at all times (al-hukm al-Islâmî 
18 See the interplay in Egypt between Islamic and European law, 
in this case French law in the form of Napoleon Code which gave 
birth to Egyptian Civil Codes. ‘Abd al-Razzâq al-Sanhuri was the main 
proponent of the Egyptian Codes which formation was also influential 
to the formation of legal reforms in other states such as Iraq, Syria, 
Libya and Kuwait. Further see Muhammad Syahnan, Modernization of 
Islamic Law of Contract: A Study of ‘Abd al-Razzâq al-Sanhuri’s Mashâdir 
al-Haqq fî al-Fiqh al-Islâmî, (Jakarta: Litbang Depag RI, 2009), p. 
186-201.
19 To know about the forms of legal systems applied in a variety 
of states, see Ade Maman Suherman, Pengantar Perbandingan Sistem 
Hukum, (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 2004), p. 308-318.
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shâlih li kulli zamân wa makân).
As a logical consequence, Islamic law applied in 
Indonesia, on one hand cannot escape the influence 
of Islamic thoughts which have been proliferated 
by innumerable global scholar and adapted to local 
need. On the other hand the user of law (subjects of 
law) cannot avoid the temptation of requesting legal 
injunctions (fatwa) to transterritorial scholar. 
Transnational Fatwa
If we observe from the vantage point of areal 
(territorial) limitation of fatwas, we could categorize 
fatwas into two, local and translocal fatwas. In this 
paper the term transnational fatwa which lately have 
been much utilized in academic circles such as used by 
Umej Bhatia in his paper titled “Transnasional Fatwa 
and Radical Jihad” published in 2004 by the Singapore 
based Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies 
Commentaries number 19.
Eventhough there has not been a clear definition of 
transnational fatwa, its roots can be traced as proposed 
by Umej Bathia who also named it cyber or satellite fatwa. 
Transnational fatwa is closely linked in its dissemination 
with the advance of information technology which have 
breached state territorial limit to have a massive impact 
in mobilizing Muslim masses.20
Different from transnational fatwa discussed by Umej 
Bathia, who in his writing focuses on jihad fatwas such 
as the ones issued by Moqtada al-Sadr (a Syiah scholar) 
about the obligation of Iraqis to fight against American 
forces in Iraq, transterritorial fatwa can be found in a 
collection of fatwas issued by Yûsuf al-Qaradhawî on a 
variety of Muslim social and religious topics, be it for 
those who live in the West or East. However in his book, 
Yûsuf al-Qaradhawî does not use the term “transnational 
fatwa”, but “fatwa for the minority” (minority fikih) 
which can be interpreted as fatwas for Muslims who live 
among non Muslims. Yûsuf al-Qaradhawî emphasizes 
that his fatwas were issued to enable Muslims who live 
among non Muslims to practice Islamic injunctions 
and to apply Islamic law wherever they may be. As a 
support of his position such that his laws can be applied 
globally, Yûsuf al-Qaradhawî quoted the Alquran verse 
115 of chapter al-Baqarah which means: “And Allah 
owns the East and West, so anywhere you face you will 
find God. Verily Allah’s blessings are plenty and Allah is 
All-Knowing”.21
20 Further see Umej Bathia, Transnasional: Fatwa Fatwas and 
Religious Authority in Indonesia, p. 1.
21 Yûsuf al-Qaradhawî, Fiqh Minoritas: Fatwa Kontemporer ter -
adap Kehidupan Kaum Muslimin di Tengah Masyarakat Non Muslim, 
pub. Adillah Obit, (Jakarta: Zikrul Hakim, 2004), p. 6.
Although Yûsuf al-Qaradhawî never describes 
his fatwa as transnational, it seems that he wishes to 
emphasize that fatwas in a transnational context can be 
applied by Muslims globally, be it by those who request 
the fatwas or those who are merely aware of the existence 
of such fatwas.
Furthermore, from an etymological viewpoint, 
the word transnational originates from English and is 
derived from two root words, trans and national. Trans 
means something that is present or moves from one 
place to another (on or from the other side of),22 while 
national means a nation or a group of societies which as 
a whole form the citizens of a state.23
As such, it can simply be said that a transnational 
fatwa is a fatwa issued by muftî of a state for (a group) of 
people in another state. The practice of issuing a fatwa 
from one state to another, seen from various perspectives 
and background, from an individual or a group of 
scholar (muftî) is called in this paper as transnational 
fatwa, fatwa which moves out of its locus (mustaftî and 
muftî are in different state or may never even meet) 
to travel globally upon request, fulfilling what can be 
called a demand and supply of law.
Based on legal psychology, acceptance, application 
and effectiveness of a transnational fatwa can be stronger 
and more powerful compared to local fatwas. This is 
at least because it is assumed that fatwas from foreign 
scholar, in this case from the Middle East, are perceived 
by some Indonesian Muslims to be more authoritative 
than fatwas from local scholar. 
With the support of information technology, 
transnational fatwa can acquire elevated social political 
power for an individual or a group of society who 
obtained the fatwas. Several examples of social political 
impacts of transnational fatwa can be seen, for example, 
on fatwas issued by Ayatollah Khomeini on the 
permissibility of assasinating Salman Rushdie, writer 
of “The Satanic Verses”, fatwa issued by Osama bin 
Laden through his al-Qaeda group on the obligation 
of Muslims to wage war against America and its allies 
and, especially for the case of Indonesia, fatwa issued 
by seven Middle Eastern scholars, upon the request of 
Indonesian Salafî groups under the umbrella of Laskar 
Jihad led by Ja’far Umar Thalib, on the obligation of 
Indonesian Muslims to perform jihad in Maluku.24
22 The Oxford Paper Back Dictionary, (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), p. 853.
23 The Oxford Paper Back Dictionary, p. 357.
24 Further on the history of Laskar Jihad movement including the 
involvement of Laskar Jihad in the socio-religious conflict in Maluku 
and Sulawesi, see Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militansi dan 
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Transnational Fatwa on Jihad
As elaborated above, transnational fatwa has become 
a contemporary phenomenon and a global issue 
assumed by non Muslims (Westerners) to be related to 
a number of violent acts committed by many Muslim 
movements in the East against the West especially in 
its hegemonic cultural form seen by many Muslims as 
something which needs to be urgently overthrown. 
On one hand, fatwa as assumed by the West as 
identical with violence or resistance do have traction in 
reality evidenced by the issuance of transnational fatwas 
related to jihad movements to wage “Eastern holy 
war” against “Western hegemony.” On the other hand 
Muslim transnational movement always campaign for 
global war against those perceived as Muslim enemies 
for the upholding of Islam as a universal religion free 
from state territorial limits and against Western neo 
colonial hegemony in Muslim states be it politically, 
economically, socially and culturally, at least according 
to Muslim radical groups.
The hostility between these two groups, aside from 
the socio-political reasons mentioned above, was surely 
influenced by ideology including systems of belief 
and breadth of thought (weltanschoung), between 
sociological based West and theological based East, 
which may never be united, as pithyly expressed by the 
proverb “East is East and West is West, never the twain 
shall met”. In other words, the West always evaluates 
based on humanistic gain and loss (socio-humanitarian 
perspectives) while the East based on right and wrong 
or Islam and non-Islam (theological-normative 
dimension).
As such, Islamic transnational movement such as 
Laskar Jihad in Indonesia, always seek legal legitimation 
for their movement by requesting issuance of jihad 
fatwas from scholar they consider authoritative and 
supportive of their movement.
In this paper the author intentionally employ the 
jihad fatwas issued by seven Middle Eastern scholars 
used by Laskar Jihad to legitimate their “holy war” in 
Maluku, in which they consider Muslims in Maluku 
to be oppressed. Based on the fatwas Laskar Jihad 
mobilized the Muslim masses to join the holy war in 
Maluku.25
With the fatwas Ja’far Umar Thalib forcefully stated 
Pencarian Identitas di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru, (Jakarta dan Leiden: 
LP3ES dan KITLV, 2008). See also Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, Gerakan 
Salafi Radikal di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Raja Granfindo Perkasa, 2004).
25 Noorhaidi Hasan, based on the interview with Muhammad 
Umar as-Sewed, elaborated that the Salafîs in Maluku as part of the 
transnational dakwah community, which in Indonesia represented by
that the Maluku conflict was an arena of holy war 
against Christian enemies attack on Islam. Ja’far stressed 
that joining the war is an obligation for Muslims as part 
of obedience of God’s command. Ja’far quoted Ibn 
Taymiyya  “... when enemies wish to launch an attack 
against Muslims, countering the attack is obligatory 
for all Muslims under attack. Also, it is obligatory for 
other Muslims not under attack to support their fellow 
Muslims”.26
As such, it cannot be denied that the issuance of 
fatwa, on one hand, provide strong legitimation for 
Salafî groups, in this case Laskar Jihad, to mobilize 
volunteers for dangerous and violent collective action 
under the leadership of Ja’far Umar Thalib. On the 
other hand, this legitimation is surely important for 
Salafî groups to reach internal agreement which could 
be a solid foundation for them to go beyond their 
fundamental beliefs to maintain consistency of a non 
political proselytization strategy, considering there 
are some Indonesian salafî groups against their jihad 
pronouncement. Groups against the mobilization of 
jihad volunteers hold that the main task of Salafî groups 
is consistent proselytization, not involvement in politics. 
They even claimed the jihad pronouncements of Laskar 
Jihad invalid and fatwas issued were forged.27
Aside from some Salafî groups who contested the 
jihad movement to Maluku, Laskar Jihad under the 
leaderhip of Ja’far Umar Thalib, armed with transnational 
fatwas from seven Middle Eastern scholars has managed 
to arouse the spirit of Salafî groups to perform jihad in 
Maluku which they claimed as defending the rights of 
Muslims and the religion of Allah.
Laskar Jihad, requested fatwa from a number of authoritative Middle 
Eastern scholars who are all related to Bin Baz, the former leader of the 
Head of Senior Scholar Council of Saudi Arabia. Among the scholar 
whose fatwas was requested was ‘Abd al-Razzâq ibn ‘Abd al-Muhsin 
al-’Abbâd, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi’î, Rabî’ ibn Hâdî al-Madkhalî, 
Shâlih al-Suhaymî, Ahmad Yahyâ ibn Muhammad al-Najm and 
Wâhid al-Jâbirî. Those fatwas were requested by the Laskar Jihad Salafî 
movement through facsimiles and telephone to their cadres studying 
in the Middle East who then forwarded the questions to the (muftî). 
As they seemed too reluctant to issue a fatwa, Ja’far Umar Thalib and 
Muhammad Umar as-Sewed visited them in person to persuade and 
provide additional information. The scholar relented and issued a fatwa, 
which in essence obligated Indonesian Muslims to perform jihad in 
Maluku. Further see Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militansi, 
dan Pencarian Identitas di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru, p. 166-167. 
26 Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militansi dan Pencarian 
Identitas di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru, p. 169. See also Noorhaidi 
Hasan, “Between Transnastional Interest and Domestic Politics: 
Understanding Middle Eastern Fatwas on Jihad in the Moluccas”, in 
Nico Kaptein and Michael Laffan, ed., Islamic Law and Society, January 
2005, p. 73-92.
27 Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militansi dan Pencarian 
Identitas di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru, p. 169-170.
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To delve into the contents of the fatwas, in this paper, 
the writer includes several fatwas which translation the 
author quotes from the book “Gerakan Salafi Radikal 
di Indonesia”. First, fatwa issued by Syaykh Rabî’ ibn 
Hâdî al-Madkhalî, an expert scholar in hadis residing 
in Mecca “It is obligatory upon every Muslim to carry 
out jihad in Maluku in order to defend the Muslims 
from attacks of the Christians. And this jihad is seen 
as defending the religion of Islam from the attack of 
Christians”.
Second, fatwa issued by Syaykh Muqbil ibn Hâdî 
al-Wadi’î, a famous scholar also expert in hadis residing 
in Yaman: 
It is obligatory upon every Indonesian Muslims 
to carry out jihad defending their brothers in 
Maluku and obligatory as a collective upon every 
Muslims outside Indonesia, noting that: (1) 
Muslims should possess the ability to carry out 
jihad against the non Muslims. (2) The effort of 
jihad must not cause conflicts among Muslims. 
(3) The ability possessed by Muslims to carry 
out jihad must not depend on the strength of 
non Muslims but depend on the strength of the 
Muslims themselves putting their trust in God. 
(4) The jihad carried out must be based on Sunna 
(translator: that is based on the creed of ahl al-
sunnah wa al-Jamâ’ah) and not based on sectarian 
divisions. (5) The jihad carried out must not turn 
Muslim away from their obligation to learn about 
Islam. (6) The jihad carried out must not give the 
impression that Muslims are fighting for political 
positions or material gain. But Muslims must be 
prepared physically and spiritually to carry out 
jihad merely for the sake of Allah to stop the 
encroachment of christians upon Muslims.
The fatwa issued by Syaykh Rabî’ ibn Hâdî al-
Madkhalî, an ahl al-sunnah wa al-Jamâ’ah scholar 
residing in Medina:
Three actions you conduct to make feasible jihad 
in Ambon are correct actions. The government’s 
prohibition against your defending of your 
fellow Muslims should not be obeyed. Because 
the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) 
has commanded: “There should be no obedience 
towards creatures if the obedience causes 
disobedience towards the Creator”.28
Ideology and Networks of Transnational Radical 
Movements in Indonesia
Discussing about transnational militant Muslim 
movements (transnational Muslim hardliner groups) 
around the world, there is no doubt that contemporary 
Salafî dakwah movements, which has slowly evolved 
since the appearance of al-Jamâ’ah al-Salafiyyah in 
28 To see further the fatwa of other Middle Eastern scholars, see 
Jamhari dan Jajang Jahroni, Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia, p. 
100-104.
Saudi Arabia in the 1960s, has contributed greatly as 
a representation of the most puritanical Muslim sects29 
mostly influenced by Wahabi thoughts (Wahabism) 
developed by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhâb (1703-
19792), who took his inspiration from the thoughts 
of Taqî al-Dîn Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328), a 
follower of Hanbalism, the strictest school of thought 
of the four widely accepted (mu’tabarah) school of 
thoughts. In its development, contemporary Salafîs were 
influenced to a large extent of the reformist-modernist 
thoughts of Jamaludin al-Afghani (1838-1935), 
Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Muhammad 
Rasyid Ridha (1865-1935) who offered plans to return 
to the times of Muslim glory through the utmost use 
of rationality (ijtihâd) and the adoption of modern 
development. As the development of contemporary 
Salafî movements went along the rise of Muslim 
political awareness against Western neo colonization 
as a result there appeared a strong desire to recover 
modern development believed to be stolen by the West 
from Muslims.30 Unfortunately, the failure of Muslims 
to recover the modern development, along with the 
internal failure of Muslims to maintain its own culture 
against Western invasion, has distorted the spirit of the 
Salafî groups from efforts of recovering modern progress 
to ideological antipathy, which in turn made the Salafî 
movement more extreme and radical. 
Thus, the Salafî not only made the West as enemy 
to be fought against but also consider any actions not 
practiced by the earliest generations (al-salaf al-shâlih) 
outside the pale of Islam.
If we delve into the ideology of the Salafî movement 
we could discern several differences between them, be 
it religious31 or social and political, which turn them 
Radical as opposed to Conservative. Among these 
differences are: first, they always exhibit the mentality 
of “holy war” when facing a different ideology (Islam-
29 Khaled M. Abou el-Fadl has written that the historical pattern of 
puritanical Salafî groups began during the Wahabi period. In his book 
Khaled Abou el-Fadl provided several elaborations of the puritanical 
groups understanding as well as their rigid and extreme applications 
including in the context of Muslim and non Muslims Relations (East-
West), matters of jihad, women and human rights. Further see Khaled 
Abou el-Fadl, Selamatkan Islam dari Muslim Puritan, Helmi Mustafa 
(tr.), (Jakarta: Serambi Ilmu Semesta, 2006).
30 Further see Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militansi, dan 
Pencarian Identitas di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru, p. 34-35.
31 An understanding of scriptural nature, which is a textual 
understanding without contextual consideration. This understanding 
will give rise to fanatical and militant attitude which in the end may 
lead personal truth claim. In other words, an understanding which 
severes the relationship between the author, the reader and the social 
context surrounding it. Further see Khaled Abo el-Fadhl, Atas Nama 
Tuhan: Dari Fikih Otoriter ke Fikih Otoritatif, R. Cecep Lukman Yosin 
(tr.), (Jakarta: Serambi Ilmu Semesta, 2003).
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Christian/East-West). This could be seen from their view 
that the current Western hegemony, as a “new form of 
colonialism”, needs to be eliminated. Also, the idea of 
Western conspiracy against Islam and the Muslim world 
is popular among this crowd and as such they propagate 
a strong anti Western feeling to the extent of rejection 
of all idea originating from the West although this is 
actually in opposition to the teachings of Jamaludin 
al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and others who they 
consider as salafiyyah reference.
Second, the enforcement of Islamic law often 
struggled for by Muslim radicals is no longer considered 
as an alternative path but an “imperative”. In other 
words, there is no other way they consider as valid 
to form an Islamic community which obeys God’s 
command except by making Islam as the foundation of 
religious, social and political life.
Third, they are exist a tendency to contest the 
government and its established systems, which 
they consider illegitimate. This is because of lack of 
government’s effort to alleviate social ills they identify as 
immoral and irreligious. As such some of these groups 
no longer trust government legal institutions to cure 
those ills and took matters to their own hand without 
consideration of ‘publicness’ of the public square.
Fourth, the spirit to uphold religion as the truth 
of God’s teaching on earth through the way of “jihad” 
earns its own place of honor. Jihad efforts especially 
through arms struggle is deemed as the most holy act.
Fifth, the worsening Muslim-Jewish relationship in 
the Palestine area, as well as the worsening relationship 
between Muslims and Christians in various region 
including Indonesia due to the contentious issue of 
christianization, has been influential to radicalize some 
militant Muslim groups,32 especially radical Salafî33 as is 
the case in Indonesia.
Militant Muslim movement (Muslim hardliners) 
in Indonesia, in this case represented by the Salafî 
movement with its various groups, lately have resurfaced 
to become a most interesting social phenomena. This is 
because these militant groups not only show themselves 
32 Further see Jamhari dan Jajang Jahroni, Gerakan Salafi Radikal di 
Indonesia, (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 2004).
33 The famous term for this is Jihadi Salafîs, but the author 
separates the term Jihadi Salafîs with Radical Salafîs, at least in the 
case of Indonesia. Radical Salafîs can be linked more to the Salafî 
groups existing in Indonesia, such as Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam, 
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, in which 
their movement is always open in nature and mass-organized. While 
the Jihadi Salafîs is more global in nature and always secretive in the 
course in their actions such as the plotting and executing bomb terrors 
by Amrozi  and Imam Samudra.  According to Solahudin, a researcher 
to be concerned with purification of religious life but 
also with the purification of social and political life.
Their appearance in the social and political arena 
surely does not occur in a sudden but with strong reasons 
and backings such that they feel that they have obtained 
strong legitimation to perform stern acts, through 
rigorous and radical means, to uphold amar ma’rûf and 
nahy munkar, a goal which they most cherish. 
In addition, the appearance of these Muslim 
hardliners in Indonesia cannot escape its roots of history, 
network and ideology of struggle, be it nationally, along 
with national political uphevals and transnationally as 
a reaction to various actions in the course of Muslim 
struggle against Western hegemony in the form of 
Christian, capitalist, materialist and liberalist ideology.
If we see from the national point of view, history 
has recorded the desire of some of Muslim community 
who formed a rebellion collective in the Movement 
of Gerakan DI/TII to form an Islamic State (Dawlah 
Islâmiyyah) out of the Indonesian state.34 This idea of 
and a reporter who presented his paper to the Salihara Community 
on 12 May 2011, several of these groups were borne out of the Salafî 
or Neo Wahabi teaching which beliefs are in principle held by both 
Salafî and Jihadi Salafî groups which both try to revive what they con-
sider as the salaf shâlih understanding of Islam, pure and undistorted 
Islam. They also possess a similar undersanding of fiqh for worship and 
tauhîd, which is tauhîd rubûbiyyah, tauhîd ulûhiyyah and tauhîd asmâ 
wa sifât. What differentiates them is Jihadi Salafîs possess a more spe-
cific understanding of jihad and tauhîd hâkimiyyah. Different from the 
Salafî groups mentioned above, there are four main doctrines of Jihadi 
Salafîs, which are: (1) The concept of qitâl fî sabîl Allâh, meaning syar’î 
jihad or physical war with no other interpretation possible. (2) The law 
on jihad which in the beginning was fardh kifâyah becomes fardl ‘ayn 
because Muslim lands have been occupied by non Muslims, be it ajnabî 
non Muslims (foreign non Muslims) or mahalî non Muslims (local non 
Muslims) such as murtad rulers who preside over Muslim countries. As 
such all Muslims are obligated to chase these non Muslims out of the 
Muslim area. (3) Irhâbiyyah (terrorism) allowed by the syariat of jihad. 
One of the forms of permissible terror is killing civilians previously 
impermissible to kill such as children, women, old people or priests. 
These innocent people whose blood are sacred can be killed if they 
help the non-Muslims fight the Muslims including in killing civilians 
in the context of qishâsh or revenge. (4) Tauhîd hâkimiyyah, the con-
cept which considers that political sovereignty is entirely in the hands 
of God. This view is in opposition to the view of democracy which 
put people’s sovereignty as the highest political sovereignty. The realiza-
tion of God’s sovereignty manifest in the application of Islamic syariah 
bounding social and political life. The rejection to Islamic syariah is 
equivalent to God’s sovereignty. As a consequence, any rejectors will be 
considered outside the pale of Islam even if he has recited the syahâdah 
and perform prayers. For more see Solahuddin, Sejarah, Faham dan 
Gerakan Jihad di Indonesia, accessed through google on 22th June 2011, 
with the keywords “fatwa tentang jihad di Indonesia”. 
34 To understand the DI/TII movement comprehensively, see 
Cis van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam 
in Indonesia, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981). Also see Hiroko 
Horikoshi, “The Darul Islam Movement of West Java: An Experience 
in the Historical Process,” in the journal Indonesia, vol. 20 (Jakarta: 
Oktober 1975) and Jajang Jahroni, “Islamic Contemporary Movement 
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DI/TII movement which later become NII in the 1970s 
has resurfaced in the movement of Majelis Mujahidin 
Indonesia.35
The case is similar with other transnasional Salafî 
hardliner groups, whose members consist of male youths 
with long robe (jalabiyah), head covering (imâmah), 
long pants (isbâl), and long beard (lihyah) and female 
youths with veil (niqôb) and black clothing which 
covers the entire body, in the public square of many 
cities such as in Jogjakarta, Solo, Semarang, Bandung, 
Jakarta, Makassar and Medan.
One of the most phenomenal Salafî groups in 
Indonesia is the Laskar Jihad group formed by Ja’far 
Umar Thalib (of Hadrami descent born in Malang in 
1961)36 and several other well-known Salafî figures such 
as Muhammad Umar as-Sewed and Ayip Syafruddin. 
Laskar Jihad, which in the beginning was a special 
division of the Forum for Communication between 
Members of ahl al-sunnah wa al-Jamâ’ah (Forum 
Komunikasi Ahli Sunnah Wal-Jamaah - FKAWJ), was 
founded in Jogjkarta on  30 January 2000, through a 
grand assembly of FKAWJ in Kridosono Yogyakarta. 
The establishment of Laskar Jihad cannot escape the riot 
events in Ambon, Maluku, which have been understood 
by most people as religious and social conflicts between 
Muslims and Christians started on 19 Januari 1999 
which is also the day of Eid of 1999 (1 Syawal 1419 
H).37
Notwithstanding the various interpretation of forms 
and nature of social conflict, which in the short term 
has produced many victims,38 Laskar Jihad view that 
in Indonesia”, dalam jurnal Refleksi, vol. II (1), (Jakarta: UIN Jakarta, 
2001).
35 Interesting to compare further the fighting methods of Majelis 
Mujahidin with the DI/TII movement first conducted attacks 
sporadically and possess transnational network while DI/TII was local 
and political in nature. On the methods conducted by the Majelis 
Mujahidin group in their fight see Muhamam Asfar (ed.), Islam 
Lunak Islam Radikal: Pesantren, Terorisme dan Bom Bali, (Surabaya: 
PuSDeHAM dan JP Press Surabaya, 2003).
36 For more on the personal history including the formal and non 
formal education background of Ja>far Umar Thalib see Jamhari dan 
Jajang Jahroni, Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia, p. 90-96.
37 Jamhari dan Jajang Jahroni, Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia, 
p. 85.
38 According to the government report as conveyed by the Head 
of Indonesian Police, then, Letjen Roesmanhadi, for three days of 
conflict (until 21 January 1999) the riot in Ambon has claimed victims 
as follow: 22 people dead, 102 heavily wounded and 45 with minor 
injury. 107 houses, 7 places of worship, 2 traditional markets, 2 banks, 
33 shops, 12 kiosks, 22 cars, 25 motorcycles and 216 motorized 
pedicabs. Further see Mohammad Shoelhi, Laskar Jihad: Kambing 
Hitam Konflik Maluku, (Jakarta: Puzam, 2002), p. 12. Eventhough 
there was no offical report on the number of victims resulting from the 
5 year conflict, according to government estimate as written by A. C. 
Manullang, the conflict shed more than 2000 lives. Further see A. C.
the Muslims in Ambon are under duress, facing the 
threat of genocide and as such it is the responsibility 
of the Muslim community to perform jihad against the 
Christians. As a result, on the date mentioned above, 
Laskar Jihad was founded to help Muslims in Ambon 
fight the Christians.
From the point of view of network and funding 
source, the Salafî movements in Indonesia, beside having 
national networks also possess strong relationships with 
transnational Salafî movements, be it in the form of 
socio-religious network39 or in the form of institution 
such as can be visibly seen in the relationship between 
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, various Jamâ’ah Islâmiyah 
groups in South East Asia and even al-Qaeda.40 The 
same strong relationship can be seen between Laskar 
Jihad who possess strong relationship with Jemaah 
Salafiyyahs in various Middle Eastern countries and 
several South East Asian and Central Asian countries. 
These relationships also exist with several universities 
in Saudi Arabia such as the University of  Imâm 
Muhammad Ibn Sa’ûd and Madinah Islamic University,41 
and in Indonesia with Jakarta-based “Lembaga Ilmu 
Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab” (LIPIA) owned 
by Saudi Arabia government. 
It is interesting to observe that Laskar Jihad not only 
possess strong relationship with several Middle Eastern 
universities, especially in Saudi Arabia, but also with 
the Salafî ulamas (muftî) residing there. This could be 
seen from the request of opinions by Laskar Jihad to 
the muftîs who in the end issued fatwa of jihad on the 
conflict in Ambon, Maluku, in 2000, which made it 
compulsory for Indonesian Muslims to perform jihad 
there. These fatwas were the scholarly weapon of Laskar 
Jihad to mobilize thousands of Indonesian Salafîs to 
participate in the Ambon conflict. 
Mashlahah as The Main Purpose of Fatwa
A question remains: why Salafî groups, such as Front 
Pembela Islam, Laskar Jihad and Laskar Mujahidin 
could easily fall into violent acts? 
Seen from a religious perspective, according to 
Francois Houtart,42 there are at least three kinds of 
Manullang, Menguak Tabu Intelijen, Terror, Motif dan Rezim, (Jakarta: 
Panta Rhei, 2001).
39 Jamhari dan Jajang Jahroni, Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia, 
p. 78.
40 Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militansi, dan Pencarian 
Identitas di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru, p. 13.
41 With regards to the institutional network of the Salafî movement 
including Laskar Jihad see Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militansi, 
dan Pencarian Identitas di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru, p. 34-35.
42  As quoted by Muhammad Asfar, Islam Lunak Islam Radikal: 
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explanations. First, religion is always interpreted as a 
theological framework which bounds social relationships 
(ideological function). This kind of theological 
interpretation, as has been commented by Amin 
Abdullah,43 has in its basic conviction of possessing 
absolute truth without bothering to delve into rational 
intepretation of religious texts. According to this 
interpretation every relationship between groups which 
form a society should have as its source the will of God, 
which should be based on the rule of God, and anything 
outside this rule should be refused and rejected. As a 
consequence there would be created personal or group 
truth claims which in turn lead to the denial of existence 
of other groups possessing their own truth claim. This 
kind of dictatorship of theological interpretation in a 
social and humanitarian context will give birth to an 
exclusive attitute which creates division between the 
right group and wrong group or in religious parlance 
between the faithful group and unfaithful group. In 
turn, it becomes ironical that religion which should be 
a source of peace and ethics has become instead source 
of strife and violence.
Second, religion is turned into a source of identity 
which can provide status, stability and a way of thinking 
such that people coming from the same background can 
differ due to religious difference.
Third, religion as a legitimation of social relationship 
which is visible in the creation of some public policies 
in which government collaborates with religious figures. 
This could be an excuse for government oppositions to 
rail against both government and the religious figures 
should the policies be deemed against God’s law.44
Religious-based violence based on fatwa is a common 
occurence in Indonesia. Examples would be the fatwa 
issued Forum Ulama Umat Indonesia (FUUI) on the 
death sentence of Ulil Abshar Abdalla, the coordinator 
of Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), because he is deemed an 
apostate,45 the fatwa issued by Majelis Ulama Indonesia 
(MUI) on the banning of Ahmadiyah and the most 
Pesantren, Terorisme dan Bom Bali, p. 54-55. 
43 Amin Abdullah stated that the fundamental structure of 
theological thought usually related to character, which are: (1) The 
tendency to put primacy over own group. (2) Personal involvement and 
with the theological thought. (3) The exposition of feeling and thought 
using ‘doer’ not ‘observer’ language. The unification of these three 
characteristics in a person or a group provides a large motivation for the 
creation of theological enclaves which tends to be exclusive, emotional 
and rigid. Further see Amin Abdullah, Studi Agama: Normativitas atau 
Historisitas?, (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1996), p. 14.
44 Haryatmoko, Etika Politik dan Kekuasaan, (Jakarta: Kompas, 
2004), p. 64. Compare with Muhammad Asfar, Islam Lunak Islam 
Radikal: Pesantren, Terorisme dan Bom Bali, p. 55.
45 Ulil Abshar Abdalla et. al., Islam Liberal dan Fundamental; Sebuah 
Pertarungan Wacana, (Yogyakarta: eLSAQ Press, 2003), p. 15.
phenomenal the fatwa by 7 Middle Eastern ulama 
on the obligation of performing jihad in Ambon as 
elaborated above. These fatwas has been proven to cause 
more harm than benefit due to the violence actions they 
inspire. 
As such a fatwa should not be accepted if it results 
in harm as this contradicts the basic philosophy for 
fatwa which is the provision of alternative solution 
made in harmony with local wisdom to bring peace, 
order and justice for a community. This is clearly stated 
by Imâm al-Syâthibî in that a mujtahid (muftî) cannot 
apply a legal injunction derived from the Alquran 
and sunah as it is but a mujtahid must consider the 
context of the community in which the fatwa is issued 
as the community is both the subject and object of the 
fatwa.46
The theory of mashlahat (istishlâh) often used in 
contemporary ijtihad when checked against the concept 
of dhawâbith al-mashlahah, as has been stated by 
Ramadan al-Bûthî, must fulfill five criteria: prioritising 
the goals of syariat, not against the Alquran, not against 
the sunah, not against the principle of qiyâs and be 
made to bring mashlahah.47 A fatwa, to the author’s 
mind, should produce mashlahah in accordance with 
qawâ’id al-’uqûl al-ijtimâ’iyyah.48
Closing Remarks
Viewed from the point of view of social history of 
fatwa development in Indonesia, transnational fatwa 
is not a new phenomenon. In the colonial times, 
fatwa had been imported to Indonesia and applied 
by the Indonesian Muslim community then. These 
transnational fatwas entered Indonesia through the 
networks of Indonesian and Middle Eastern scholar 
especially those who reside in Mecca, as Mecca was 
considered the most authoritative territory to refer all 
religious matters to. From the point of view of content 
(substance), the transnational fatwas issued then 
broadly revolved around issues of worship, civil matters 
(al-ahwâl al-syakhshiyyah) and socio-religious life. 
Different from the colonial transnational fatwa, 
contemporary transnational revolves more around 
46 Abû Ishâq al-Syâthibî, al-Muwâfaqât, (Beirut: Dâr al-Kutub al-
’Ilmiyyah, 2002), p. 76-77.
47 Muhammad Sa’îd Ramadhân al-Bûthî, Dhawâbith al-Mashlahah 
fî al-Syarî’ah Al-Islâmiyyah, (Beirut: Muassasah al-Risâlah, 1986), p. 
142.
48 The idea of qawâ’id al-’uqûl al-ijtimâ’iyyah is an approach in the 
methodology of legal arrangement in the contemporary Ushûl al-Fiqh 
study and this  idea has been published in World Journal of Islamic 
History and Civilization (IDOSI Publication).
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politics and ideology as a result of a perceived clash 
between the Muslim and Western world, be it in the 
field of economics, politics, social and cultural. 
As in global competitions Muslims are always on the 
losing side, due to their frequent inabilities to compete 
rationally and scientifically, that is based on science and 
technology, there appeared a number of movements 
seeking religious legitimation to fight against the West 
which then becomes enemies in the fields mentioned 
above. 
The religious legitimation is often accompanied 
by the authority of fatwas in its transnational form. 
These fatwas are used by puritanical and ideological 
Salafî groups, in Indonesia represented by Laskar Jihad, 
to support their war against the West and against all 
ideologies they deem as being outside the pale of pure 
Islam.
In their use of these transnational fatwas, these 
Salafîs always speak in the context of jihad (which they 
understand to be a war against “global crime”).  As such 
fatwas have gained a new and negative recognition by 
some Westerners who equate fatwa with legitimation of 
war, violence and violations of human rights. []
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